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I. INTRODUCTION
This Article argues that psychologists can make an important and
fundamental contribution to the law by articulating the possibility of a
law-abiding society, and by showing how such a society can be created
and maintained. Such a contribution involves the application of psycho-
logical models of social values to our conceptions of how to effectively
maintain the rule of law.
The effective rule of law requires that citizens comply with the
regulatory rules enshrined in the law and enforced by legal authorities.
Most recent discussions of such compliance rest upon the idea that law-
breaking behavior is deterred by the risk of being caught and punished
for wrongdoing. A law-abiding society is one in which people are moti-
vated not by such fears, but rather by a desire to act in socially appro-
priate and ethical ways. Such a society is self-regulatory, since citizens
within it take onto themselves the responsibility to follow the law. In a
society in which people act on their social values, citizens are motivated
to voluntarily defer to law and to legal authorities because they think:
(1) that the behaviors prohibited by law are also immoral (morality)
and/or (2) that legal authorities are entitled to be obeyed (the legitimacy
of legal authorities).
In this analysis, the similarities and differences associated with the
exercise of legal authority are examined based on: (1) deterrence; (2)
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morality; and (3) legitimacy. This Article first contrasts deterrence to
strategies linked to citizens' social values (morality and legitimacy).
The exercise of legal authority via (1) morality and (2) legitimacy are
then compared.
The Articles in this symposium focus on the legal and policy-
related issues raised in Paul Robinson and John Darley's recent book
Justice, Liability, and Blame: Community Views and the Criminal Law'
and in the review of that book by Christopher Slobogin.2 This Article's
goal is to articulate a larger conceptual framework within which the
concerns addressed in the Robinson and Darley book can best be un-
derstood, as well as to present other research in the rapidly emerging
area of "psychological jurisprudence."3
The central argument this Article makes is that focusing upon the
social values held by the public is one key component of an effort to
create and sustain a legal order, the effectiveness of which is linked to
the consent and cooperation of citizens. Such a legal order is referred to
as a "law-abiding" society because it is rooted in the willingness of citi-
zens to voluntarily defer to legal authorities.
A society that is law-abiding, in which most citizens follow the law
and obey legal authorities voluntarily because they essentially consent
to legal regulation and are motivated to cooperate with legal authorities,
is superior to one in which legal authorities must compel obedience
through the threat or use of force. To have a law-abiding society, we
must have a polity in which citizens have social values that lead them to
feel responsible for following rules, irrespective of the likelihood of
being caught and punished for rule breaking.
This Article's focus is on two central social values that might serve
as the basis for a law-abiding society: The belief that laws describe
morally appropriate behavior, and the belief that legal authorities are
legitimate authorities whose directives ought to be obeyed. Either or
both of these social values might potentially serve as the basis for a law-
abiding society, and the value of each is considered here, as well as the
interplay between these two types of social values.
1. PAUL H. ROBINSON & JOHN M. DARLEY, JusTICE, LIABILTY, AND BLAME: COMMUNrrY
VIEws AND THE CRIMINAL LAW (1995).
2. See Christopher Slobogin, Is Justice Just Us? Using Social Science to Inform Substan-
tive Criminal Law, 87 J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 315 (1996) (reviewing PAUL H. ROBINSON &
JOHN M. DARLEY, JusTICE, LIABILTy, AND BLAME: COMMUNrrY VIEWs AND THE CRMINAL LAW
(1995)).
3. See John Darley et al., Paper Prepared for the American Psychology-Law Society Con-
ference on Taking Psychology and Law into the 21st Century, Psychological Jurisprudence (Sept.
2, 1999) (on file with the Hofstra Law Review).
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II. LAW AND LAW-ABIDINGNESS
The function of the law, of legal institutions, and of legal authori-
ties, is to regulate the behavior of citizens. If the law is to be effective in
fulfilling its regulatory role, most citizens must obey most laws most of
the time.4 Although it is necessary to the effective functioning of soci-
ety, obtaining such compliance can by no means be taken for granted.
Laws and the directives of legal authorities restrict the ability of citizens
to behave as they wish. Consequently, people resist them, and the accep-
tance of the dictates of the law is always problematic.
A central contribution that psychology can make to the field of
law, which seeks to understand ways in which the rule of law can be ef-
fectively maintained, is that it can help to clarify how public compliance
with the law can be facilitated. Psychologists can do so by expanding
the understanding of the motivations for human behavior that informs
the thinking of legal authorities. The effort to do so reflects one aspect
of psychological jurisprudence-the application of psychological
knowledge to a core issue within the law.
This Article posits that a better understanding of the psychology of
human motivation is of great interest to legal authorities, members of
the legal profession, and to those working within legal institutions such
as the courts, the police, and prisons. During the last several years, all of
these legal actors have expressed concern about their inability to effec-
tively secure citizen compliance with the law.
Examples of the policy problems arising out of difficulties with se-
curing public compliance with the law abound. One set of problems re-
lates to the difficulty of securing the acceptance of judicial decisions in
matters as diverse as child support payments and the dispute resolution
decisions made in small-claims courts.
Another set of problems involves the difficulties of gaining public
compliance with laws ranging in scope from drug laws to income tax
rules. Legal authorities depend heavily on the willingness of citizens to
obey everyday laws without requiring the presence of police officers or
the threat of sanctions by the courts. Increasingly in recent years, how-
ever, there have been suggestions that the public ignores laws as simple
as stopping at red lights and as key to society as paying taxes.
Other problems stem from the inability to effectively change the
future behavior of those who come before the law because of past illegal
actions (to "reform" criminals). Central to many traditional views about
securing compliance is the belief that people who do wrong can be re-
4. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 19 (1990).
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habilitated into citizens who will comply with the law in the future. This
rehabilitative ideal has declined, leading to questions regarding how to
respond to those who break social rules.
The problems involved with implementing laws have led to wide-
spread calls from legal authorities and law scholars for social science
help in understanding how to secure the effective rule of law.!
This call from legal authorities for social science input is an impor-
tant opportunity for psychologists to put forward a new psychological
perspective on people's relationships to society and to social rules-a
psychological jurisprudence model. The concerns being expressed by
legal authorities suggest that current models of the motivations that
shape people's behavior are not providing them with an adequate basis
for effective social regulation. This Article's call for increased attention
to psychological jurisprudence is linked to a more complete model of
human motivation that is based upon a broader psychology of the per-
son. This Article's efforts to develop such a model build upon the prior
efforts of psychologists and other social scientists to speak to this same
question of human motivation.6
The idea of a psychological jurisprudence model has been recog-
nized by a variety of psychologists in the law and psychology commu-
nity.7 Potentially, this psychological jurisprudence model can have
many facets. Some are linked to an understanding of human motivation,
others to an understanding of human cognition and decision-making.
The comments here focus on issues of human motivation. However, the
same core concept of psychological jurisprudence that is being applied
to motivation in this analysis has implications for many other areas of
law and psychology. In each area, the law benefits from being guided by
a complete and accurate model of the psychology of the person. Psycho-
5. See, e.g., Sharon D. Herzberger, Social Science Contributions to the Law: Understand-
ing and Predicting Behavior, 25 CONN. L. REv. 1067, 1067 (1993) (demonstrating that the overlap
of the interests of social scientists and legal professionals can be useful to secure the effective rule
of law).
6. See ELLEN S. COHN & SUSAN 0. WHrTE, LEGAL Soc.AuzATION: A STUnY OF NORMS
AND RULES 7 (1990); Richard Lempert, Strategies of Research Design in the Legal Impact Study.
The Control of Plausible Rival Hypotheses, in COMPLIANCE AND THE LAW: A MULTI-
DISCIPLINARY APPROACH 67, 67 (Samuel Krislov et al. eds., 1972); Paul E. Meehl, Law and the
Fireside Inductions: Some Reflections of a Clinical Psychologist, in LAW, JUSTICE, AND TiE
INDIViDuAL IN SOcm: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSUES 10, 10 (June Louin Tapp & Felice J.
Levine eds., 1977); Gary B. Melton & Michael L Saks, The Law as an Instrument of Socialization
and Social Structure, in NEBRASKA SYMPOSIUM ON MOTIVATION 1985: THE LAW AS A BE-
HAVIORAL INSTRUMENT 235, 235-36 (Richard A. Dienstbier & Gary B. Melton eds., 1986).
7. See Darley et al., supra note 3, at 4.
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logical jurisprudence is the application of such models to important ar-
eas of the law.
III. MOTIVATIONS FOR BEHAVIOR
When we consider possible motivations for people's law-related
behavior, whether public or private, we can draw upon the extensive
social psychological literature on the motivations that shape people's
social behavior. Social psychologists usually think of social behavior as
developing from two core motivations: Environmental forces and social
values.8 These two forces form the core of Kurt Lewin's famous for-
mula that behavior is a function of the person, the individual's attitudes
and social values, and of the environment, incentives and risks within
the social environment.9
A. Deterrence: Incentive and Sanction-Based
Models of Human Motivation
The first important force shaping people's behavior is the influence
of the contingencies in an environment on the behavior of the people
within that environment. The influence of external contingencies can
include an impact of anticipated gains and/or anticipated losses. Calcu-
lation of each factor involves an assessment of the likelihood of poten-
tial gains and losses, as well as an evaluation of their expected magni-
tude. Taken together, these calculations combine to tell people whether
engaging in some action is likely to be beneficial to their personal self-
interest.
The influence of environmental contingencies is combined with the
already noted influence of attitudes and social values. These two basic
factors shape what a person does within any given situation. This Arti-
cle explores the influence of social values in a later section.
The idea that people's behavior with respect to the law is shaped
by calculations of expected gain and loss is the core premise of rational
choice theory."0 At this time, this economic model of the person domi-
8. See KURT LEviN, FIELD THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE: SELECTED THEoRETICAL PAPERS
170-71 (Dorvin Caxtwright ed., 1951); N. Dickon Reppucci, Context, but Not Development:
Comments on Fagot's 'Context and Culpability in Adolescent Crime,' 6 VA. J. SOC. POL'Y & L.
599, 599-600 (1999) (citing KURT LEWIN, FIELD THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE: SELECTED
THEORETICAL PAPERS 170-71 (Dorwin Cartwright ed., 1951)).
9. See LEWIN, supra note 8, at 170-71; Reppucci, supra note 8, at 599-600 (citing KURT
LEWIN, FIELD THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE: SELECTED THEORETICAL PAPERS 170-71 (Dorwin
Cartight ed., 1951)).
10. See DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION: ESTIATiNG THE EFFECrS OF CRIMINAL
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nates law and public policy. In the case of the regulation of people's be-
havior, the rational choice model focuses upon the ability of expected
losses associated with law-breaking to lessen the likelihood that people
will break the law." In the context of law, this model is referred to as
the social control model of law-related behavior, or as the influence of
deterrence factors on behavior.'
2
The social control model is the primary model of human motiva-
tion that has guided the recent efforts of the American legal system to
manage society.'3 The application of this model of human motivation to
the issue of social control has had dramatic effects on the nature of
American society. Consider the case of the American prison popula-
tion. 14 Because of the belief that crime is deterred by the threat and/or
experience of punishment, a large number of American citizens have
been convicted and sentenced to spend time in American prisons." To-
day the United States is a world leader in the percentage of its citizens it
holds in prison.'6
Does a social control model work? Some research supports the
suggestion that variations in the perceived certainty and severity of
punishment do shape people's compliance with the law. 7 In particular,
SANCIONS ON CRIME RATEs 16 (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978); Raymond Paternoster, Deci-
sions to Participate in and Desist from Four Types of Common Delinquency: Deterrence and the
Rational Choice Perspective, 23 L. & SOC'Y REv. 7, 10 (1989).
11. See Daniel S. Nagin & Raymond Paternoster, The Preventive Effects of the Perceived
Risk of Arrest: Testing an Expanded Conception of Deterrence, 29 CRIMINOLOGY 561, 580-81
(1991); Paternoster, supra note 10, at 10-12, 37.
12. See Paternoster, supra note 10, at 37.
13. See Jack B. Weinstein & Fred A. Bernstein, The Denigration ofMens Rea in Drug Sen-
tencing, FED. SENTENCING REP., July-Aug. 1994, at 122 (citing MICHAEL MCCONVLLE &
CHESTER MIRSKY, GuILTY PLEA COURTs: A SOCIAL DISCIPLINARY MODEL OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
51 (1994)); see also Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEX. L. REV.
645, 676 (1985) (discussing the functions of law in the social control model). In addition, the so-
cial control model has been examined and applied in other contexts. See, e.g., Llewellyn J. Gib-
bons, No Regulation, Government Regulation, or Self-Regulation: Social Enforcement or Social
Contracting for Governance in Cyberspace, 6 CORNELL J.L. & PuB. POL'Y 475, 518-19 (1997)
(describing the role of the social control model in governing cyberspace); Norbert Gilmore, Drug
Use and Human Rights: Privacy, Vulnerability, Disability, and Human Rights Infringements, 12 J.
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 355, 400 (1996) (examining the role of the social control model in
regulating drinking and smoking).
14. See Craig Haney & Philip Zimbardo, The Past and Future of U.S. Prison Policy:
Twenty-Five Years After the Stanford Prison Experiment, 53 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 709, 709 (1998).
15. See id. at app. fig.A1.
16. See id.
17. See, e.g., Harold G. Grasmick & Robert J. Bursik, Jr., Conscience, Significant Others,
and Rational Choice: Extending the Deterrence Model, 24 L. & Soc'Y REV. 837, 838-40, 857
(1990) (discussing studies demonstrating a correlation between legal sanctions and the commis-
sion of crimes); Paternoster, supra note 10, at 37 (classifying the certainty and the severity of
punishment as two of several factors that contribute to an individual's decision regarding whether
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people's behavior is often, although not always, found to be shaped by
their estimate of the likelihood that, if they disobey the law, they will be
caught and punished. 8
Although research supports the basic premise of the deterrence
model, it also suggests that estimates of the likelihood of being caught
and punished have, at best, a minor influence on people's law-related
behavior. Some studies suggest that such estimates do not independently
influence behavior when the influence of other factors is considered.' 9
Other studies find an independent influence, but it is typically small in
magnitude.' For example, Robert MacCoun estimates that about five
percent of the variance in people's use of illegal drugs is explained by
their estimates of the likelihood of being caught and punished for rule
breaking.2 Given the large number of societal resources that have been
devoted to changing drug-related behaviors, this minor deterrence effect
is striking.
In other words, research findings suggest that people's compliance
with the law is, at best, weakly linked to the risks associated with law-
breaking behavior.' As a result, social control strategies based primarily
on a deterrence model of human behavior have, at best, had limited suc-
cess. 2
to commit a crime).
18. See Nagin & Paternoster, supra note 11, at 574-75, 580-81; Paternoster, supra note 10,
at 37; Raymond Paternoster, The Deterrent Effect of the Perceived Certainty and Severity of Pun-
ishment: A Review of the Evidence and Issues, 4 JUST. Q. 173, 174, 211 (1987) [hereinafter Pater-
noster, The Deterrent Effect]; Raymond Paternoster & LeeAnn lovanni, The Deterrent Effect of
Perceived Severity: A Reexamination, 64 Soc. FORCES 751,769-70 (1986) [hereinafter Paternoster
& lovanni, The Deterrent Effect: A Reexamination]; Raymond Paternoster et al., Perceived Risk
and Social Control: Do Sanctions Really Deter?, 17 L. & Soc'Y REV. 457, 457 (1983).
19. See, e.g., Paternoster & Iovanni, The Deterrent Effect: A Reexamination, supra note 18,
at 768-69 (discussing numerous other factors, besides the likelihood of being caught and punished,
which contribute to the deterrence of crime).
20. See, e.g., Robert J. MacCoun, Drugs and the Law: A Psychological Analysis of Drug
Prohibition, 113 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497, 501 (1993) (discussing the small influence that fear of
punishment has in decisions to use illegal drugs); Nagin & Paternoster, supra note 11, at 580-81
(discussing several studies indicating that "sanction threats and perceived informal costs have in-
dependent crime-inhibiting effects"); Paternoster, The Deterrent Effect, supra note 18, at 211 ('It
seems more likely that perceptions of the certainty of punishment and the perceived sociallmaterial
costs of punishment are independent influences on behavior.").
21. See MacCoun, supra note 20, at 501.
22. See Paternoster & Iovanni, The Deterrent Effect: A Reexamination, supra note 18, at
769.
23. See H. LAURENCE Ross, DmnERRiNG THE DRINKmG DRivEl 107-09, 111 (1982); Paul H.
Robinson & John M. Darley, The Utility of Desert, 91 NW. U. L. REv. 453, 456, 458 (1997); Tom
R. Tyler, Citizen Discontent with Legal Procedures: A Social Science Perspective on Civil Proce-
dure Reform, 45 AM. J. Cow,. L. 871, 873 (1997) [hereinafter Tyler, Citizen Discontent]; Tom R.
Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws: A Psychological Perspective, 29 N.Y.U. J.
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B. The Role of Morality and Legitimacy in
Producing Law-Abiding Behavior
The limits of the social control model suggest the importance of
developing a broader model of motivation." A psychological jurispru-
dence approach can expand the scope of our conception of possible mo-
tivating factors to be more consistent with current social psychological
models of the person.
This expanded model of the person leads to an examination of a
second type of factor that social psychologists view as central to the
determination of people's behavior-the set of internal values that
shape people's feelings about what is ethical or appropriate to do.' As
previously noted, two types of internal motivations might potentially be
important: attitudes and-values. Of these, attitudes are most important
when the issue involved is encouraging desired behavior, such as extra
effort at work. If people want their organization to do well, they volun-
tarily work harder.26
In the case of rule following, the relevant internal motivation is the
feeling of obligation or responsibility to act appropriately. This discus-
sion focuses on two such social values: (1) the belief that following the
rules is the morally appropriate thing to do; and (2) the belief that rules
are legitimate and ought to be obeyed.
This Article's argument is that the influence of these values on
citizen behavior provides an alternative model upon which an effective
legal system can be created and maintained. Further, this Article argues
that this model is a uniquely social psychological model. It builds upon
the recognition by social psychologists that people develop internal val-
ues. This Article refers to a society based upon this model of human
motivation as a law-abiding society.
These social values are distinct from contemporaneous judgments
of self-interest. Further, they exercise an important independent influ-
ence on people's behavior. Social values represent people's sense of
what is ethically and morally appropriate behavior.
INT'L L. & POL. 219, 220-22 (1996-97) [hereinafter Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property
Laws]; Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Fairness and Compliance with the Law, 133 SwiSS J. ECON. &
STAT. 219, 219-40 (1997) [hereinafter Tyler, Procedural Fairness].
24. See Paternoster, supra note 10, at 37-38.
25. See Grasmick & Bursik, supra note 17, at 839-40.
26. See TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS: PROCEDURAL
JusTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIoRAL ENGAGEMENT (forthcoming 2000) (On file with
authors).
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The concept of social values is nicely captured in Martin Hoff-
man's comment on the development of moral values.2 7 He suggests:
The legacy of both Sigmund Freud and Emile Durkheim is the agree-
ment among social scientists that most people do not go through life
viewing society's moral norms as external, coercively imposed pres-
sures to which they must submit. Though the norms are initially exter-
nal to the individual and often in conflict with his desires, the norms
eventually become part of his internal motive system and guide his be-
havior even in the absence of external authority. Control by others is
thus replaced by self-control2
This quote articulates a central feature of social values-their influence
on people's behavior separates from the influence of factors in the ex-
ternal environment. Values become a part of the person and lead them
to exercise self-regulation over their behavior so that their behavior is
consistent with the internal principles and values that define their sense
of themselves. In such a situation, people do not so much comply with
the law as they accept and consent to it, deferring to law and legal
authority because they feel it is the right thing to do.
When people have internal values that influence their behavior, it
is not necessary to shape their behavior by threatening them with pun-
ishment for wrongdoing. People take the responsibility for following
rules upon themselves. They do so if they feel that the law is reasonable
and fair, so that they feel that it makes sense to them to be involved with
legal authorities, to "sign on" to participation in society, and to volun-
tarily accept its rules. They then become willing to be governed by law
and take on the responsibility for following laws and obeying the direc-
tives of legal authorities.
Recognition of the role of internal values in shaping law-related
behavior suggests the possibility of a value-based perspective on peo-
ple's behavior. That perspective emphasizes the importance of develop-
ing and sustaining a value climate, a "legal" or "civic" culture, in which
people abide by the law because they feel it is the right thing to do. Such
a perspective represents an important perspective for legal psychologists
to articulate and advocate within the legal community. It is based upon a
key contribution that social psychologists can make to our understand-
ing of how society can effectively regulate citizen behavior, maintain
social order, and promote an effective and efficient society, through de-
27. See Martin L. Hoffman, Moral Internalization: Current Theory and Research, in 10




veloping and maintaining a culture of supportive social values among
the citizens within society."
As previously noted, there are two key social values that are po-
tentially central to a law-abidingness perspective. The first is the belief
that it is morally right to follow the law.' This judgment is linked to
people's assessment that the behaviors prohibited by law are contrary to
their moral values. For example, murder is not simply an illegal action.
Most people also believe that murder is morally wrong. Even if murder
were suddenly made legal, most people would not commit murders be-
cause murdering someone would still be contrary to their own sense of
what is right and wrong. Further, they would feel the need to punish
others who murdered. In fact, in earlier societies, private groups of
people, often united by kinship, frequently banded together to seek re-
venge following a murder.' They did so because their sense of morality
led them to feel that justice must be restored in the aftermath of im-
morality.
The second key value is the belief that it is part of a person's duty
as a citizen to accept legal rules and to obey the directives of legal
authorities.32 If citizens believe that legal authorities are legitimate, they
regard them as entitled to be obeyed 3 In such a situation, they obey
laws because they regard deferring to social authorities as part of the
obligations associated with citizenship. As with morality, they view
following rules issued by legitimate authorities as the appropriate social
behavior within a particular social situation. If, for example, a police
officer tells a citizen to do something, such as to pull to the side of the
road or stop his car, the citizen typically accepts this directive. Citizens
regard it as appropriate for police officers to direct citizen behavior, and
they follow these directives without requiring explanation or justifica-
tion. Further, they follow these directives without thinking about
whether they will be punished for failure to comply. Although the threat
of punishment is always in the background when dealing with legal
29. See Tyler, Citizen Discontent, supra note 23, at 885; Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual
Property Laws, supra note 23, at 224-25; Tyler, Procedural Fairness, supra note 23, at 222; Tom
R. Tyler, The Psychology of Public Dissatisfaction with Government, in PUBLIc ORIENTATIONS
TOWARD GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES (John R. Hibbing & Elizabeth Theiss-Morse eds.,
forthcoming 2000) (manuscript at 6, on file with authors).
30. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 1, at 201.
31. See Jeremy D. Weinstein, Note, Adultery, Law, and the State: A History, 38 HAsTINGs
LJ. 195, 197-98 (1986) (noting that in some earlier societies, members of such kinship groups felt
morally obligated to exact blood revenge when a member of the group had been wronged by acts
such as homicide and adultery).
32. See TYLER, supra note 4, at 3.
33. See id. at 4.
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authorities, most people accept authorities' decisions, not simply be-
cause they fear them, but also because most people view them as legiti-
mate authorities who ought to be obeyed.
Do people's social values matter? This Article examines this issue
by testing the role of social values in shaping citizen compliance with
the law. Professor Tyler has done this in a study of citizens' everyday
acceptance of the law, which found that both morality and legitimacy
have an effect on compliance that is: (1) separate from the influence of
risk assessments; and (2) stronger than the impact of risk assessments.'
Other studies support this finding by demonstrating the important role
of both moral values" and beliefs about the legitimacy of legal authori-
ties on reactions to law and legal authorities. These studies provide
preliminary evidence that a law-abidingness model can lead to a viable
legal order.
IV. DEVELOPING AND MAINTAINING A CULTURE THAT SUSTAINS
LAW-ABIDINGNESS
The law-abidingness perspective directs our attention to two key
issues: the socialization of social values during childhood and the prob-
lem of sustaining a legal culture among adults.
A law-abiding approach would not be possible with citizens who
lack social values, since they do not have the internal moral values or
feelings of obligation that lead to law-abidingness. Hence, the law-
abiding society depends upon the successful socialization of most citi-
zens into its legal culture. If this is accomplished, then legal authorities
can then depend upon the voluntary deference of most citizens, most of
the time. Such behavior allows society to function efficiently, with legal
authorities directing their coercive resources at the small minority of
citizens lacking in social values. If, however, that group becomes too
large, it would rapidly overwhelm the ability of legal authorities to ef-
fectively implement social regulations.
While childhood socialization is key to the initial establishment of
supportive social values, people are also influenced by their adult expe-
34. See id. at 58-60.
35. See Grasmick & Bursik, supra note 17, at 853-54; see also Harold G. Grasmick & Don-
aid E. Green, Legal Punishment, Social Disapproval and Internalization as Inhibitors of Illegal
Behavior, 71 J. CRmi. L. & CRIINOLOGY 325, 334 (1980) (stating that certain variables, such as
"moral commitment, perceived threat of legal punishment and threat of social disapproval" act as
factors inhibiting illegal behavior).
36. See DAviD BEErHAM, THE LEGITIMATION OF POWER 4-5 (1991); Mark C. Suchman,




rience with legal authorities.37 This influence can be personal, develop-
ing out of the experiences that citizens have with police officers and
judges. It also can result from the reports about those authorities that
citizens experience through friends, family, coworkers, or via the mass
media. Irrespective of how people acquire information, the point is that
citizens' views regarding authorities are not frozen during adulthood;
they are responsive to information that citizens acquire during their eve-
ryday lives.
A. The Morality of the Law
1. The Importance of Moral Socialization
Developmental psychologists link the development of social values
to the socialization experiences of the child. Most children's basic ori-
entations toward society and social institutions are shaped most pro-
foundly during the early years of their lives, through their experiences
with their families and school. Moral values develop early in life.
The study of moral value socialization suggests that a central factor
shaping whether children take on key moral values is their relationship
with their parents.39 Through mechanisms of identification and internali-
zation, children develop a personal commitment to following moral
rules, and link that commitment to their sense of themselves and their
estimates of their self-worthi4 Thereafter, the failure to follow moral
rules leads to feelings of guilt, a negative emotional state that reflects a
person's feeling that they have failed to act as they should.4' Of course,
the form and strength of moral values changes over time, and people
can change their views about morality over their lifetimes. Nonetheless,
childhood socialization is the period during which people's basic orien-
tation toward moral rules is formed.
It is also clear that it is not necessarily the case that children will
learn social values. This is illustrated most clearly by the literature on
moral socialization. That literature suggests that at least some children
are socialized in ways that minimize the development of moral values;
37. See TYLER, supra note 4, at 94.
38. See, e.g., Patricia M. Worthy, Diversity and Minority Stereotyping in the Television
Media: The Unsettled First Amendment Issue, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 509, 534 (1996)
(stating that if children lack the requisite level of real-world experience, they may be unable to
acquire proper values, beliefs, concepts, attitudes, and basic socialization patterns).
39. See ROBERT D. HESS & JUDITH V. TORNEY, THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL AT-
TrruDES IN CHILDREN 95-96 (1967).
40. See Hoffman, supra note 27, at 85-87.
41. Seeid.at9o-91.
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their socialization is characterized by inconsistent physical discipline.42
Such socialization leads to a personality that is not guided by moral
concerns, and to behavior that flows from instrumental judgments about
the potential gains and costs associated with rule following and rule
breaking.43 A small proportion of adults becomes career criminals, act-
ing without the type of internal restraints that shape the behavior of
most citizens.
2. Sustaining a Legal Culture: Adult Judgments about the
Morality of Law-Breaking
Irrespective of how they emerge from childhood, citizens live long
adult lives. During adulthood their social values continue to be shaped
by the events of their society, as well as by their own personal experi-
ences with the law.
To sustain its moral authority, the law must be experienced as
consistent with people's sense of morality. If not, people's desire to do
what is morally right will not lead them to support legal authorities and
obey the law. The laws must reflect the moral sensibilities of the citi-
zenry. However, Robinson and Darley demonstrate that there are many
areas of law in which differences exist between law and public moral-
ity.4" These discrepancies suggest a potential problem for a law-
abidingness approach. They indicate areas in which law-abidingness
cannot be enhanced by appealing to moral values, since the law does not
accord with people's sense of right and wrong.
Typically, people are less willing to follow legal rules when those
legal rules are not supported by their moral values.45 Consider an exam-
ple of a recent area of law that has struggled with problems of the in-
consistency of law with people's moral values: American drug policy.
Although drug use is illegal, many citizens do not view the use of drugs
as immoral. Consequently, there is no moral force leading those citizens
to abide by the law. This presents difficulties, difficulties similar to
those seen in the prohibition era of earlier days. When the behavior in
42. See, e.g., Emily Campbell, Comment, The Psychopath and the Definition of "Mental
Disease or Defect" Under the Model Penal Code Test of Insanity: A Question of Psychology or a
Question of Law?, 69 NEB. L. REV. 190, 212-13 (1990) (noting the negative effects of inconsistent
discipline); Lee N. Robins, What Determines Rates of Homicide over Time and Place: Can We
Find Out?, 69 U. COLO. L. REv. 1009, 1020 (1998) (noting that children born into households that
foster criminality often experience harsh and inconsistent discipline).
43. See Hoffman, supra note 27, at 86.
44. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 1, at xv, 2.
45. See TYLER, supra note 4, at 57, 64-66, 68.
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question is not viewed as morally wrong, people's obedience will be
more strongly linked to estimates of risk.
This model suggests the value of using an approach such as that of
Robinson and Darley to identify areas in which the rule of law may be
problematic. These areas are likely to be those in which the public
views law as divergent from their sense of moral correctness.47 A fa-
mous example of such a perceived divergence is the public's general
belief that the courts are too easy on criminals. In other words, the pub-
lic believes that people do not receive the morally appropriate punish-
ment for many crimes. Instead, they receive too little punishment. So,
legal code violations are punished in a way that citizens think is not ap-
propriate. As Robinson and Darley note: "[i]f a rule derived by desert
theorists is judged overwhelmingly by the community to be unjust, such
disagreement may cast some doubt upon the accuracy of the rule in as-
sessing a person's moral blameworthiness, at least suggesting that
closer scrutiny of the reasoning behind the rule is required.'"5 This Ar-
ticle argues that this disagreement suggests that people are less likely to
accept the law, since it will not correspond to their own sense of what is
right and wrong.
More generally, a psychological jurisprudence model suggests an
agenda item for law and psychology research on morality; that is the
study of people's conceptions of morality in law-related areas. As noted
previously, one such effort is that of Robinson and Darley.49 Another is
the work of Norman Finkel, who examines "commonsense" notions of
law and justice among members of the public." These efforts are consis-
tent with the more general recent trend within law and social science to
examine the "legal consciousness" of people within American society."
46. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 1, at xv, 2 (describing the 18 original studies on
which the authors relied to identify areas of the law and specific examples of laws that are in ten-
sion with the collective morals of the community).
47. See id at 2.
48. Id. at 6.
49. See id. at 2-3.
50. See NORMAN J. FINKm, COMMONSENSE JUSTICE: JURORS' NOTIONS OF THE LAW (1995).
51. For examples of studies exploring the American legal consciousness, see PATRICIA
EwICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW: STORIES FROM EVERYDAY LIFE 17
(1998) (using the stories of ordinary people to "trace the ways in which commonplace transactions
and relationships come to assume (or not assume) a legal character"); V. LEE HAMILTON & JOSEPH
SANDERS, EVERYDAY JUSTICE: RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL IN JAPAN AND THE UNITED
STATES 3 (1992) (utilizing individuals' reactions to stories of wrongdoing "to suggest a social
structural basis for how individuals or nations may come to differ in their judgments of wrongdo-
ing"); SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN: LEGAL CONSCIOUSNESS
AMONG WORKING-CLASS AMERICANS 1 (1990) (analyzing the legal consciousness of people that
leads them to bring their personal problems to court); Timothy J. Flanagan, Reform or Punish:
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Further, such everyday notions of justice and morality need to be
compared to both the actual law "on the books" and to the law that the
public believes exists "on the books."52 This approach is used exten-
sively by Robinson and Darley, who systematically explore the relation-
ship between public views and the formal law across a wide range of le-
gal issues. 3 The issue of the law as the public imagines it, in
comparison to the actual law, is the topic of the most studied public
view that the courts are too lenient on criminals.' This view is based
upon evidence demonstrating that the public believes that the punish-
ments that people should receive for their crimes often depart from the
actual punishments given by the courts.55
B. The Legitimacy of Legal Authorities:
Political Socialization
The study of the development of views about the legitimacy of
authorities leads to a focus on political socialization. Like the literature
on moral socialization, the literature on political socialization suggests
that basic orientations toward law and legal authorities develop early in
life. 6 Children learn a sense of civic responsibility which includes a
duty to obey rules and to accept the directives of legal authorities,
authorities that they learn to regard themselves as being obligated to
obey.' As with their moral values, people's feelings about obligation
Americans' Views of the Correctional System, in AMERICANS VIEW CRIME AND JUSTICE: A
NATIONAL PUBLIC OPINION SURVEY 75, 75-92 (Timothy J. Flanagan & Dennis R. Longmire eds.,
1996) (detailing a study on people's opinions of the correctional system in the United States).
52. See PETER H. Rossi & RICHARD A. BERK, JUST PUNISHMENTS: FEDERAL GUIDELINES
AND PUBLIC VIEws COmPARED 207 (1997).
53. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 1, at 2.
54. See Tom R. Tyler, Public Mistrust of the Law: A Political Perspective, 66 U. CIN. L.
REV. 847, 854-55 (1998).
55. See ROBINSON & DARLEy, supra note 1, at 202 (stating that legal codes and public
views frequently differ).
56. See FRED I. GREENSTEIN, CHILDREN AND PoLrrcs 1, 44 (rev. ed. 1969) (noting that
many of the political orientations that guide adult voters are acquired between the fourth and the
eighth grades); HESS & TORNEY, supra note 39, at 7, 26 (explaining that there is strong evidence
of continuity between childhood and adult political attitudes, and that many of these attitudes are
formed in elementary school, particularly between the fourth and fifth grades); HERBERT H.
HYMAN, POLrICAL SOCIALIZATION: A STUDY IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF POLITICAL BEHAVIOR 53,
59 (1959) (explaining that children's interest in politics is considerable by age 13, and that by the
first year of high school political orientation has developed substantially); Richard G. Niemi, Po-
litical Socialization, in HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL PSYCHOLOGY 117, 118 (Jeanne N. Knutson ed.,
1973) (noting that political learning is deeply rooted in childhood, and that this early learning has
long-lasting effects).
57. See Tom R. Tyler & Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of Discretion-
ary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion Rights, 43 DUKE LJ. 703,
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evolve throughout life;58 however, the basic development of feelings of
obligation to law and to civic authorities is rooted in childhood sociali-
zation.59
The key to the success of a strategy of social regulation based upon
law-abidingness is the appropriate socialization of children. The child-
hood socialization process is the time during which basic social values
develop and take on an independent role in shaping children's behavior.
That role is evident as early as the teenage years, during which law-
abidingness is found to be linked to both moral values' and to feelings
of obligation toward legal authorities."
Similarly, children may not learn to respect and trust legal authori-
ties. They may learn to fear those authorities and to regard them as ad-
versaries and agents of external control. If they do, then their behavior
will be limited to their estimate of risk, not to social values.
V. SUSTAINING A LEGAL CULTURE: MAINTAINING THE PUBLIC'S
VIEw THAT LEGAL AUTHORITIES ARE LEGIIMATE AND OUGHT TO BE
OBEYED
Sometimes legal authorities cannot rely upon or create a moral
consensus behind the law. In such situations, they rely upon the public
view that they are legitimate authorities and, as such, ought to be
obeyed. 62 For example, when the Supreme Court declared abortion to be
a legal right,' it made a decision that many citizens thought was morally
wrong. Yet, most citizens deferred to the decision. Why? Because they
view the Supreme Court as a legitimate social institution whose deci-
sions ought to be obeyed.
The belief that legal authorities are legitimate and entitled to be
obeyed provides an alternative basis for the viability of law. As citizens,
the people within a society learn that they should obey legal and politi-
cal authorities. They defer to those authorities because the authorities
743 (1994) ("[C]onsiderable feelings of obligation to abide by the dictates of this system of gov-
ernment develop.").
58. See June Louin Tapp & Lawrence Kohlberg, Developing Senses of Law and Legal Jus-
tice, in LAW, JusTICE, AND THE INDIVIDuAL IN SoClErY: PSYCHOLOGICAL AND LEGAL ISSuEs 89,
104 (June Louin Tapp & Felice L Levine eds., 1977).
59. See Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 57, at 743.
60. See Augusto Blasi, Bridging Moral Cognition and Moral Action: A Critical Review of
the Literature, 88 PSYCHOL. BULL. 1, 12 (1980) ("Mhat delinquent individuals tend to use devel-
opmentally lower modes of moral reasoning than do... nondelinquents.").
61. See TYLER, supra note 4, at 31.
62. See id. at 170.
63. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153, 164-65 (1973).
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are entitled to make decisions about the appropriateness of behavior in
particular situations.6 For example, army officers are entitled to order
soldiers into combat, just as political officials are entitled to direct citi-
zens to join the army and to pay taxes, etc. Studies show that those citi-
zens who view authorities as legitimate are more willing to defer to the
decisions of these authorities.5
Legitimacy provides greater and more reliable authority to legal
officials than does morality, since legal officials have discretionary
authority to decide what is appropriate. Within the scope of their pre-
scribed roles, the police and courts make decisions, and citizens believe
that they ought to obey those decisions. Because legitimacy invests
authorities with discretionary authority, it is a more flexible form of so-
cial value upon which to base the operation of the legal system. With
morality, the discretion rests with citizens, who decide whether or not
the law corresponds to their moral values.
The legitimacy of authorities is an especially promising basis for
the rule of law, because research suggests that it is not linked to agree-
ment with the decisions made by legal authorities.6 If people viewed as
legitimate only those authorities who make decisions with which they
agree, it would be difficult for legal authorities to maintain their legiti-
macy, since they are required to make unpopular decisions, which may
deliver unfavorable outcomes.
Fortunately, from the perspective of legal authorities, studies sug-
gest that legitimacy is linked to the fairness of the procedures used by
authorities to make decisions.6 Consequently, legal authorities can
maintain their legitimacy by making decisions ethically. The procedural
justice model directs the study of legitimacy and obligation to the feel-
ings, needs, and concerns of the people who deal with legal authorities.
If those people believe that the legal authorities are exercising authority
in fair ways, they are more likely to defer to those authorities. This is
true for reactions to personal experiences with legal authorities.4 It is
64. See HERBERT C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE: TOWARD A
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF AUTHORrTY AND RESPONSIBILITY 89 (1989) ("Once a demand is catego-
rized as legitimate, the person to whom it is addressed enters a situation where his personal prefer-
ences become more or less irrelevant... ).
65. See TYLER, supra note 4, at 31-32.
66. See id. at 172.
67. See E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL
JUSTICE 65-83 (1988); JOHN THBAUT & LAURFENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSY-
CHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 67-116 (1975) (discussing, in chapters 8-11, studies linking legitimacy to
the fairness of procedures); TYLER, supra note 4, at 172.
68. See TYLER, supra note 4, at 172; Tom R. Tyler et al., Maintaining Allegiance Toward
Political Authorities: The Role of Prior Attitudes and the Use of Fair Procedures, 33 AM. J. POL.
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also true when people are evaluating national level political and legal
authorities like the Supreme Court.6'
Perhaps most importantly, from the perspective of the legal system,
a number of recent studies link judgments about procedural fairness to
the willingness both to accept particular legal decisions70 and to gener-
ally follow laws and legal rules." Procedural justice is found to play an
especially important role in securing compliance over time.' It is clear
that people's behavioral reactions to law and legal authorities are heav-
ily influenced by their assessments of the fairness of legal procedures.
VI. COMPARING POTENTIAL BASES FOR A LAW-ABIDING SOCIETY
The difficulties involved in trying to manage the regulation of citi-
zens using deterrence based approaches have already been outlined. As
was noted, legal authorities have a great deal to gain by being able to
rely upon the consent and cooperation of citizens. This Article has la-
beled a society that is linked to such self-regulatory approaches a law-
abiding society.
Research suggests that both morality and legitimacy can poten-
tially be the basis for a legal order that rests on the idea of law-
abidingness. This creates the possibilities shown in Figure 1. We might
have a society based upon shared moral values ("a morally just soci-
ety"); a society based upon shared views that authorities are legitimate
("a legitimate state"); or a society based upon both sets of internal val-
ues ("a dual justification society"). Absent any of these bases for a law-
abiding society, we have the social control-based society described by
deterrence theory.
Scr. 629, 630 (1989).
69. See Tom R. Tyler, Governing Amid Diversity: The Effect of Fair Decisionmaking Proce-
dures on the Legitimacy of Government, 28 L. & Soc'y REv. 809, 811-12, 828 (1994); Tyler &
Mitchell, supra note 57, at 714-24.
70. See LIND & TYLER, supra note 67, at 66-70; Katherine M. Kitzmann & Robert E. Emery,
Procedural Justice and Parents' Satisfaction in a Field Study of Child Custody Dispute Resolu-
tion, 17 LAw & HuM. BEmAv. 553, 554 (1993); Roselle L. Wissler, Mediation and Adjudication in
Small Claims Court: The Effects of Process and Case Characteristics, 29 L. & SOc'Y REV. 323,
324(1995).
71. See RIcHARD SPARKS Er AL., PRISONS AND THE PROBLEM OF ORDER 87-89 (1996);
TYLER, supra note 4, at 82; W. Chan Kim & Ren6e A. Mauborgne, Procedural Justice, Attitudes,
and Subsidiary Top Management Compliance with Multinationals' Corporate Strategic Decisions,
36 ACAD. MGMT. L 502, 503,506-10 (1993).
72. See Peter A. Dillon & Robert E. Emery, Divorce Mediation and Resolution of Child
Custody Disputes: Long-Term Effects, 66 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 131, 131-32 (1996); Ray-
mond Paternoster et al., Do Fair Procedures Matter? The Effect of Procedural Justice on Spouse
Assault, 31 L. & Soc'Y REv. 163, 165-66, 192 (1997); Dean G. Pruitt et al., Long-Term Success in
Mediation, 17 LAw & HUM. BEmAv. 313, 315-16 (1993).
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Figure 1. Social Values as a Basis for the Law-Abiding Society
Having identified these two potentially important sources of self-
regulatory behavior, this Article next considers how the nature of soci-
ety is shaped by choices about whether morality or legitimacy will be
the basis upon which law-abidingness occurs.
A. Comparing Morality and Legitimacy
As noted earlier, morality and legitimacy share the common char-
acteristic of being social values.73 They represent people's sense of how
they ought to act. Consequently, they reflect two types of self-regulatory
motivations for personal action. Building a law-abiding society involves
using people's feelings of morality and/or legitimacy as a core basis for
gaining their deference to the law and to legal authorities.
But which type of social value should be used? It should be em-
phasized that either form of self-regulation might potentially serve as
the basis for a viable society. However, the choice among approaches
has important consequences for the nature of the society within which
they are used.
1. The Relationship of Morality and Legitimacy in Everyday Life
As previously noted, Professor Tyler has found that, in the case of
obeying laws in people's everyday lives, morality and legitimacy rein-
force each other.74 Citizens regard it as both immoral and illegitimate to
break the law.75 In most democratic societies, there is at least some cor-
73. See supra notes 24-36 and accompanying text.
74. See TYLER, supra note 4, at 6.
75. See id. at 44, 46. "Citizens seem to view breaking laws as a violation of their personal
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respondence between public morality and the law. This is true because
both the political and legal systems reflect the operation of democratic
political processes through which the values of the public are translated
into public policies.
The general convergence of legitimacy and morality does not
mean, of course, that morality and public policy are the same thing.
There may be discrepancies between the two, and areas of discrepancy
tend to be contentious and controversial areas of high visibility, such as
abortion rights. It is easy, therefore, not to focus on the many areas in
which law and morality converge.
The point is that morality and legitimacy often compliment each
other, creating a dual justification for complying with the law and with
legal authorities. In such cases, we would expect people to be especially
willing to be law-abiding, voluntarily taking the responsibility to obey
the law and accept the decisions of legal authorities. We would expect
to find that people follow the law even when the likelihood of being
caught and punished for wrongdoing is low.
2. Enhancing the Convergence Between Legitimacy and Morality
While legitimacy and morality often converge, in some areas this
convergence may be weak. In these areas, it is possible for legal
authorities to try to enhance the convergence of law and legitimacy. To
do so, they need to follow the lead of the work of Robinson and Darley,
and identify areas of discrepancy between people's personal moral val-
ues and the law.76 This involves two potential types of effort: first, an
effort to bring the formal law into congruence with public moral val-
ues;7 and second, an educational campaign designed to make the public
aware of the true nature of the formal law.78 If people correctly under-
stand the law, and the law truly reflects public moral values, then the
legitimacy of the law and personal morality would converge as forces
for law-abidingness.
a. Using Knowledge of Public Morality to Define the Law
One approach is to bring the law into consistency with public mo-
rality. An interesting example of such an effort is the work of Christo-
morality." Id. at 44. "[Bloth personal morality and the legitimacy of legal authorities encourage
citizens to be law-abiding." Id. at 46.
76. See ROBINSON & DARLEY, supra note 1, at 201-15 (discussing the conflicts between
community views and criminal laws).
77. See id. at 202.
78. See id. at 215.
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pher Slobogin on the intrusiveness of law enforcement officials into
people's lives.79 Slobogin argues that we might most effectively build
the law defining what constitutes a serious intrusion into people's pri-
vate lives by using public views about the intrusiveness of various types
of police intervention into people's lives. 0
To suggest what the rules governing intrusions into people's lives
ought to be, Christopher Slobogin and Joseph E. Schumacher conducted
a study in which the members of the public rated the "intrusiveness" of
a variety of law enforcement investigative techniques.8' These tech-
niques range from behaviors that members of the public rate to be
highly intrusive, such as a body cavity search at a border or having
one's phone monitored, to behaviors that the public rates as generally
unobtrusive, such as looking in the foliage in a public park or going
82through a magnetometer at an airport.
Slobogin argue that the decisions of the Supreme Court defining
the formal law of search and seizure should be shaped by these public
views, with the Court making the legal requirements for searches higher
when those searches are defined by members of the public to be more
intrusive." If the Court accepted and followed this principle, it would be
acting to bring the formal law into line with people's feelings about
what is right or wrong. This Article suggests that such an effort would
enhance the public's willingness to accept government searches of pri-
vate individuals.
There are, of course, problems with any effort to bring law into line
with public morality. One key problem is that it raises the question of
whose morality should define the law. If there is a consensus about mo-
rality, this issue does not arise. However, such a consensus can never be
taken for granted. Consider the prior example of searches and seizures.
Slobogin and Schumacher did not systematically examine the relation-
ship between citizens' background characteristics and attitudes about
intrusiveness.' However, we might predict that the disadvantaged mi-
norities, who are the subject of many law enforcement intrusions, might
79. See Christopher Slobogin, The World Without a Fourth Amendment, 39 UCLA L. Rsv. 1
(1991).
80. See id. at 49-50. "[Tihe public is more likely to perceive unnecessary police intrusions as
illegitimate when they are significant." IL at 50.
81. See Christopher Slobogin & Joseph E. Schumacher, Rating the Intrusiveness of Law
Enforcement Searches and Seizures, 17 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 183 (1993).
82. See idL at 186, 188-89 tbl.l.
83. See id. at 184, 198-99. Slobogin and Schumacher propose that "some sense of how
(innocent) citizens view the intrusiveness of various types of searches and seizures would be rele-
vant to current Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." IL at 184.
84. See id. at 186, 188-89 tbl.1.
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rate intrusions to be much more "intrusive" than would middle-class
whites. If so, then it would be problematic to bring the law into line with
the values of one group, as opposed to another.
Another approach is to seek to create a moral consensus in favor of
the existing law, in an effort to bring morality into line with law. For
example, after early efforts to diminish drug use by threats and long
prison terms were largely unsuccessful," greater effort was placed on
trying to create a feeling that drug use was morally wrong. Through
campaigns such as "just say no to drugs" an effort was made to label
drug use as morally wrong. Such beliefs, once developed in children,
provide a motivational force against the use of drugs. Children learn
that they should not use drugs because it is morally wrong to do so. 6
b. Educating the Public About Misconceptions Regarding
the Law
The other possibility for enhancing the convergence of the law and
morality is to educate the public about the many areas in which mem-
bers of the public incorrectly believe that the law is inconsistent with
their moral values.' Studies suggest that members of the public typi-
cally have little knowledge about the courts, and that their knowledge is
influenced by mass media accounts that are often inaccurate."3 As a con-
sequence, people usually overestimate the rate of violent crime and of-
ten think that it is rising when it is actually stable or even declining.
Further, the public faults the courts for what the public inaccurately per-
ceives as procedural errors that the courts make, including letting too
many innocent people go free via the insanity defense ° and excluding
illegally obtained evidence."' Finally, although the public generally be-
85. See Tyler, Citizen Discontent, supra note 23, at 873; Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual
Property Laws, supra note 23, at 220-21.
86. See Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 57, at 783.
87. See Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws, supra note 23, at 227 ("[Ihe
law can have an important symbolic function if it accords with public views about what is fair, but
it loses that power as the formal law diverges from public morality.").
88. See Julian V. Roberts, Public Opinion, Crime, and Criminal Justice, in 16 CRIME AND
JUSTICE: A REVIEW OF RESEARCH 99, 103, 109 (Michael Tonry ed., 1992).
89. See id. at 109-12 (noting numerous examples of public misperceptions regarding crime
statistics).
90. See Tyler, supra note 54, at 854-55; see, e.g., Eric Silver et al., Demythologizing Inaccu-
rate Perceptions of the Insanity Defense, 18 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 63, 63, 67 tbl.2 (1994)
(detailing the results of an empirical study that examined public perceptions regarding the insanity
defense).
91. See, e.g., Craig D. Uchida & Timothy S. Bynum, Search Warrants, Motions to Suppress
and "Lost Cases:" The Effects of the Exclusionary Rule in Seven Jurisdictions, 81 J. CmlM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 1034, 1064 (1991) (discussing and analyzing the results of an empirical study that
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lieves that the sentences given for crimes are too lenient, studies show
that members of the public would give the same sentences as do judicial
officers, if they were shown the case facts that are available to judicial
officials.'
All of these misconceptions suggest a need for public education."
The point of each is that the public may actually view the operations of
legal authorities as much more consistent with public morality than it
believes. If so, it is not necessary to change the law; it is only necessary
to educate the public about what the law actually is. This will bring the
law into harmony with public views about what is right, without any
actual changes in the law.
B. The Clash Between Morality and
Legitimacy
Although morality and legitimacy may often reinforce themselves,
it is also clear that morality and legitimacy can clash. Robinson and
Darley, for example, note many cases in which law and morality are in
conflict to at least some degree.'
Consider a highly visible case of the clash between legitimacy and
morality: the issue of abortion. The legitimacy of the authority of the
United States Supreme Court dictates that citizens accept the holding of
Roe v. Wade95 and defer to the occurrence of abortions." The Court is
empowered by the Constitution to interpret the legal rights of Ameri-
cans, and most Americans accept the legitimacy of this role for the
Court.9
However, what if people's moral values lead them to think that
abortion is morally wrong-that it is the equivalent of murder? Of
examined the affects of the exclusionary rule on search warrant cases).
92. See Shari Seidman Diamond, Revising Images of Public Punitiveness: Sentencing by Lay
and Professional English Magistrates, 15 L. & Soc. INQuIRY 191, 193, 208 (1990).
93. See Gale A. Norton, Comments on Zimring and Hawkins's Crime Is Not the Problem:
Lethal Violence in America, 69 U. CoLo. L. REv. 1163, 1171 n.28 (1998) (citing FRANKLIN E.
ZMIMRGN & GORDON HAWKINS, CRIME Is NoT THE PROBLEM: LETHAL VIOLENCE IN AMERICA 169
(1997) (citing JOHANNES ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DErERRENCE 116 (1974))).
94. See Robinson & Darley, supra note 23, at 482-83 (citing murder, abortion, and animal
rights as examples of areas in which a conflict exists between the law and morality).
95. 410 U.S. 113, 164 (1973) (holding that a criminal abortion law "that excepts from crimi-
nality only a life-saving procedure on behalf of the mother, without regard to pregnancy stage and
without recognition of the other interests involved, is violative of the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment").
96. See Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 57, at 710, 798 (arguing that the legitimacy of the Su-
preme Court's decisions is founded on the public's perception that its decisions do not merely re-
flect shifts in Court personnel, but instead are constrained by rule-of-law values).
97. See id. at716,723,797-98.
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course, even under the Roe v. Wade doctrine," people who think abor-
tion is murder need not have an abortion themselves. They do not have
to actively participate in an immoral action. However, they need to ac-
quiesce to allowing others to have abortions. As many opponents of
abortion note, this can be viewed as acquiescence to immorality.' For
example, when soldiers stand by and watch civilians be murdered by
other soldiers, we think this is wrong and they should take action to stop
it. That is, moral codes often impose a duty on people to resist the im-
moral actions of others, even if those actions are not directed against
them. People often act as groups to enforce morality in a community,
for example, chasing and beating up someone who has injured another.
It would not, therefore, be surprising to see groups arising to resist what
they view as an immoral act like abortion. On the other hand, to act in
this way would, in this case, involve a conflict with one's civic duty,
which is to defer to the Court.1m
In a case like abortion, there is an inevitable clash between support
for state authority and one's personal morality.'0 ' The difficulty that
such a clash can create for a society is illustrated by the story of a group
that calls themselves "the rescuers."'' 2 This group is one of many within
the anti-abortion community." 3 Believing that abortion is murder, this
group's members originally organized protests designed to be non-
violent, following the model of the civil rights movement.' 4 They felt
that their principled opposition to abortion would lead society to change
its laws. 5 However, they failed to achieve this objective, and eventually
began to engage in increasingly violent actions, such as blocking the
98. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153 (explaining that the "right of privacy ... is broad enough to
encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy").
99. See Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 57, at 756-58, 759 tbl.1.
100. See J. Daniel Mahoney, Thoughts on Originalism, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1225, 1232
(1997) (discussing Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992) (O'Connor, J., Ken-
nedy, J., and Souter, J., concurring), which deferred to the Roe decision, and, in effect, advised
anti-abortion groups to "get lost" because their actions had been in conflict with their constitu-
tional and civic duties).
101. See Book Notes: Women and the Law, 22 L. & Soc. INQUIRY 531, 533 (1997) (reviewing
GAIL KELLOUGH, ABORTING LAW: AN EXPLORATION OF THE POLMCS OF MOTHERHOOD AND
MEDICINE (1996)).
102. See Regina R. Campbell, Comment, "FACE"ing the Facts: Does the Freedom of Access
to Clinic Entrances Act Violate Freedom of Speech?, 64 U. CIN. L. REV. 947, 952-53 (1996).
103. See Jennifer Burt, Constitutional Law-Individual Rights, 64 GEO. WASH. L. Rsv. 1004,
1005 (1996).
104. See Campbell, supra note 102, at 953-55 (describing Operation Rescue's protest strate-
gies).
105. See Paul R. Davis & William C. Davis, Student Article, Civil Disobedience and Abor-
tion Protests: The Case for Amending Criminal Trespass Statutes, 5 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHIcS &
PUB. POL'Y 995, 1010 (1991).
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entrances to clinics as an act of civil disobedience.' These acts were
still within the framework of the law, since group members accepted ar-
rest and jail time/fines as a consequence of their actions.'O As time went
by, and abortion laws were not changed, this group increasingly en-
gaged in acts of sabotage against clinics.' 3 At first, such acts were care-
fully timed to avoid harm to people. However, over time, the group's
acts escalated into hunting and assassinating doctors who perform abor-
tions."t What this shows is how, over time, the group's view that the
law and legal authorities were legitimate and trustworthy declined, as
did their respect for the rule of law. The driving force for this decline
was their inability to change the law to be more consistent with their
own moral views.
Such clashes are not unusual. The long history of the conflict be-
tween religion and state authority provides many examples of this type
of conflict." Historically, the church defined moral rightness through a
distinct set of principles, institutions, and authorities and, as such, could
often be inconsistent with the morality of law and state authorities."'
Further, such alternative models of morality were supported by institu-
tions and authorities." This is important since people seldom are found
to be willing to take a moral position simply based upon personal be-
liefs, without any institutional support for their views."
The clash between morality and legitimacy also occurs in many
more mundane, but also important, areas of law. An example is pro-
106. See Campbell, supra note 102, at 954-55.
107. See id. at 954.
108. See id. at 957.
109. See id. at 956.
110. See KELMAN & HAMfLTON, supra note 64, at 65-68 (discussing the history of this ideo-
logical conflict through the writings of Church thinkers such as Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas
Aquinas).
111. See Raymond C. O'Brien, Single-Gender Marriage: A Religious Perspective, 7 TEMP.
POL & Civ. RTS. L. REv. 429, 437 (1998). Historically, the Church "define[d] ... the interaction
between religion and individual liberty ... [and] society's morals. [The criticism of s]uch a notion
is captured in former vice president Valter F. Mondale's quote: 'God doesn't belong in politics."'
Id. (citing Kevin P. Quinn, Book Review, AMERICA, Nov. 27, 1993, at 19 (reviewing STEPHEN L.
CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: How AMERICAN LAW AND POLMCS TRwIALuE RELIGIOUS
DEVOTION (1993)).
112. See id. But see Robert Justin Lipkin, Kibitzers, Fuzzies, and Apes Without Tails: Prag-
matism and the Art of Conversation in Legal Theory, 66 TUL. L. REv. 69, 126 (1991) (noting that
today there are extreme differences of opinion between church and state regarding controversial
moral questions such as abortion, affirmative action, and free speech).
113. See KEimAN & HAMILTON, supra note 64, at 56-57; Alan E. Brownstein, Interpreting
the Religion Clauses in Terms of Liberty, Equality, and Free Speech Values-A Critical Analysis




vided by the role of legal authorities in criminal cases. When a person
breaks a criminal, as opposed to a civil, law, they have committed a
crime against the state. For example, rape or assault is a crime against
the state, not just an action that hurts particular victims. The state takes
the matter out of the hands of victims and their families and community,
those who might be inclined to pursue private vengeance. The state then
disposes of the case in some manner, often through a plea bargain.
A conflict between the victim and the community and the state oc-
curs when the victim and/or the community feel that the sentence given
for the crime is not morally correct."' In particular, people may feel that
either the verdict is unjust ("a guilty person went free") or that the sen-
tence was inadequate ("too lenient")."5 In these cases, justice has not
been done. People's moral values are offended by the acts of the legal
system, and people feel that the balance of justice has not been restored.
Again, this reflects a conflict between public morality and the actions of
state authorities.
The examples that have been given are cases in which the state
takes action that the public regards as immoral. It is also possible for
people to act on their moral values and take actions that the state regards
as clashing with the legitimacy of state authorities. An example of this
is the history of conscientious objection-in which a person takes an
action for moral reasons.116 In the case of conscientious objection, a per-
son refuses to fight in a legitimate war because they feel that doing so
would be immoral.117 The state, of course, seeks to compel all citizens to
acknowledge the legitimacy of state policies-in this case, the state's
right to invoke a citizen's duty to defend the state. In this situation, the
state typically seeks to punish those who act on their moral values.
In situations in which legitimacy and morality clash, is it better to
build a society on moral consensus, or on state legitimacy? There is not
a clear sense that one approach is better than the other. Each approach
has some benefits and some potential dangers and risks.
114. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 46-48 and accompanying text.
116. See MARGAREr LEvI, CoNsENT, DIssENT, AND PATRIOTISM 165 (1997) ("Historically
the term referred to opposition to war and conscription on grounds of conscience .... ).
117. See KELMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 64, at 140; Michael Kenneth Isenman, 1990 Sur-
vey of Books Relating to the Law, 88 MCH. L. REV. 1474, 1479 n.13 (1990) (reviewing HERBERT
C. KELMAN & V. LEE HAMILTON, CRIMES OF OBEDIENCE: TOWARD A SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF
AUTHORITY AND RESPONSIBILIY (1989)).
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C. Moral Consensus as the Basis for
Law-Abidingness
1. Building a Society on a Moral Consensus
There are many examples of societies united by a common relig-
ious heritage or cultural background." 8 In such societies, most or all
citizens share a set of common moral values."9 Societies of this type
often do not even draw a distinction between religion and the state, and
religious leaders are often consulted about the appropriate law to govern
some area of social conduct.12
Saudi Arabia and Israel are examples of societies in which relig-
ious leaders have an important voice in articulating what the law should
be.12' They have this voice because it is believed that the law should re-
flect moral values, and those values are articulated by religious author-
ity." It would, of course, also be possible to accept the principle that
morality should define law, but not to link morality to religion.
The advantage of a model of law that links law to moral correct-
ness is that the powerful influence of moral values is directed at law-
related behavior."D People feel that the law represents morality, and
their desire to behave in ethically appropriate ways leads to the effective
rule of law. In such a society, people do not experience the psychologi-
cal conflict that occurs when they must decide between acting as they
think morally correct, and following the directives of legitimate
authorities.
118. See Michel Rosenfeld, Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC: Affirmative Action at the
Crossroads of Constitutional Liberty and Equality, 38 UCLA L. REv. 583, 605 (1991).
119. See Joanne Yasus, Note, What's in a Name? Nothing Good If It's Friday: The Seventh
Circuit Invalidates Good Friday Public School Holiday, 29 J. MARSHAIL L. REv. 1031, 1061
n.189 (1996).
120. See, e.g., Paul J. Zwier & Ann B. Harmric, The Ethics of Care and Reimagining the Law-
yer/Client Relationship, 22 J. CoNTEMP. L. 383, 387 n.10 (1996) (noting that religious ethics
parallel the ethics of care and, therefore, religious leaders are consulted before the commencement
of a lawsuit).
121. For a discussion of the relationship between Saudi Arabian law and religion, see Thomas
M. Franck, Is Personal Freedom a Western Value?, 91 AM. J. INT'L L. 593, 607 (1997). For a dis-
cussion of the relationship between religion and the law in Israel, see Gerald Gunther, A Model
Judicial Biography, 97 MICH. L. REv. 2117, 2127 (1999) (reviewing PNINA LAIHAV, JUDGMENT IN
JERUSALM: CHIEF JUSTICE SIMON AGRANAT AND THE ZIONIST CENTURY (1997)).
122. See S.I. Strong, Law and Religion in Israel and Iran: How the Integration of Secular and
Spiritual Laws Affects Human Rights and the Potential for Violence, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 109,
110, 112 (1997) (explaining that, in Israel and Iran, religious principles have been incorporated
into the substantive law).
123. See Walter J. Walsh, The Fearful Symmetry of Gay Rights, Religious Freedom, and Ra-
cial Equality, 40 How. L... 513, 547 (1997).
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2. Problems with Building a Legal Order on Moral Consensus
The problem with moral consensus as a basis for the rule of law is
that it assumes that it is both desirable and feasible to create and main-
tain a moral consensus among the members of a society. In a pluralistic
society such as the United States, it is more difficult to see how moral
consensus could be the basis for law-abidingness. While most citizens
share some basic sense of common morality around issues such as mur-
der and incest, there are many other issues in which people do not agree.
Abortion represents an obvious case of such disagreement.
One factor that mitigates against finding a moral consensus within
a society is the institutional separation of legal, political, and moral
authority. Modem political states often define themselves as separate
from any particular religious authority or moral code. They view them-
selves as existing as a separate set of institutions and authorities, func-
tioning based upon distinct social values. At its most extreme, this sepa-
ration defines the state as clearly distinct from any given religion or
moral code (the separation of church and state). This idea is central to
American government-with freedom of religion and of thought de-
fined as human rights by our Constitution 4 and Declaration of Inde-
pendence."z According to these principles, there is a distinct private
sphere of life within which people are free to hold whatever ideas they
deem fit to believe.
A second factor that mitigates against moral consensus is the
definition of this private personal sphere of life that is under the control
of the individual. This notion is linked to the idea of a value-neutral
state, since the state is designed to protect the autonomy of the individ-
ual, rather than to impose any particular moral code or set of social val-
ues on the members of a society. 6 This type of society is potentially
"pluralistic," with many private moral codes coexisting within a com-
mon group.27
In a society with private moral values, and with a value-neutral
state, it may be difficult or impossible for the state to base the rule of
law on the assumption that there will be a set of common moral values.
It seems likely that, even in such a society, common moral values will
define some acts, such as murder, to be immoral. Those acts are likely
to be illegal also. But what about more ambiguous behavior, such as
124. See U.S. CoNST. amend. I.
125. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE pam. 1, 32 (U.S. 1776).
126. See Jendi Reiter, Serial Killer Trading Cards and First Amendment Values: A Defense of
Content-Based Regulation of Violent Expression, 62 ALB. L. Rnv. 183, 204 (1998).
127. See id.
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drinking, using drugs, being a homosexual, or having an abortion? Such
actions are likely to be viewed as moral by some people, immoral by
others.
In a society unwilling to define a common moral code, effective
legal regulation may need to be based on the legitimacy of state
authorities. Further, it may require that legitimacy itself be based on
something besides the values that the authorities use to make their deci-
sions. That is, it requires that people judge authorities based upon how
they make decisions, not upon what those decisions are. As already
noted, there is considerable evidence that such a society can be viable.
People do evaluate authorities in terms of the procedures they use to
make decisions."'
These arguments suggest that the form of authority that can lead to
the effective rule of law may be linked to the nature of the underlying
society. In a society such as the United States, it may be difficult to use
moral consensus as the basis for an effective society. In a society such
as Iran, Israel, or Saudi Arabia, morality may be a more effective basis
for viable social regulation. Those societies are more willing to define a
common morality. 9
D. Legitimacy as the Basis for a
Law-Abiding Society
Legitimacy has appealing characteristics as a possible basis for the
rule of law. On its face, it appears to be an all purpose mechanism of
social coordination, since people feel obligated to obey whatever laws
or decisions that legal authorities make, within some scope of action
within which the authority has legitimacy to act.3
Illustrations of the power of legitimacy to shape behavior abound.
Most strikingly, when legitimacy and morality clash, legitimacy often
dominates people's behaviors. Legitimacy has the property of
"authorizing" people's behavior. That is, people often view their own
moral values as irrelevant when a legitimate authority is present.'31 An
128. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and Team Production in Post-Capitalist Society, 24 .
CoRp. L. 869,902 (1999).
129. See supra notes 118-22 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, With Charity
for All, 93 YALE LJ. 1415, 1509 (1984) (noting that because a common morality permeates its
society, "'you're not going to change the morality in Saudi Arabia" (quoting Transcript of tele-
phone conversation between John Richard, NYPIRG, and Dan M. Burt at 5 (Apr. 11, 1984) (on
file with Oliver A. Houck))).
130. See Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost: Limitations of Current Approaches to Lawyer Regula-
tion, 71 S. CAL. L. REv. 1273, 1311-12 (1998).
131. See TYLER, supra note 4, at 63. Tyler writes:
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example is provided by Stanley Milgram's study of obedience to legiti-
mate authorities." In the study, people were directed to engage in be-
havior that they believed hurt another person.' Obedience was wide-
spread."3 As Herbert Kelman and V. Lee Hamilton note:
It is interesting that, in the postexperimental debriefing, [a participant
who shocked the confederate at the maximum level] seems unable to
understand a question about whether there are any conditions under
which he might have stopped administering shocks to the
[confederate]. As far as he is concerned, he did stop-and he seems
dismayed to learn that some participants did not stop. He stopped; it
was the [authority] who continued. His hand may have been on the
switch, but the decision and the responsibility were clearly the experi-
menter's.135
1. The Psychological Dynamics of Legitimacy
For legitimacy to be effective, it is necessary for legitimacy to be
based upon something besides agreement with decisions or policies.
136Procedures are one obvious basis for legitimacy. The research already
outlined makes clear that people do, in fact, evaluate the exercise of
authority primarily on procedural grounds.'37 The procedural basis of
legitimacy suggests a separation of legitimacy from the substance of
decisions.' This separation means that legitimacy should be an ideal
vehicle for the effective regulation of people's behavior.
2. Problems with Building a Legal Order on Legitimacy
Despite its seemingly appealing characteristics, legitimacy has
elements that make it a problematic basis for an effective legal order.
One key element is the ability of legitimacy to separate people from
Respondents are almost equally likely to comply with the law because they view it as
legitimate whether they think the likelihood of their being caught is high or low,
whether or not they think their peers would disapprove of law breaking, and whether or
not they think law breaking is morally wrong.
IL
132. See STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AmTHoRrrY: AN EXPEimENTAL VImW (1974)
(discussing various social science experiments that tested individuals' responses to perceived
authority figures).
133. See id. at 20-21.
134. See iL at 35 tbl.2.
135. KELMAN & HAMILTON, supra note 64, at 155.
136. See, e.g., Scagnelli v. whiting, 554 F. Supp. 77, 79 (M.D.N.C. 1982) (noting that where
there are "published written procedures .... the legitimacy of a claim.., acquired outside those
procedures is vitiated because there is no basis for" it).
137. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
138. See Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 57, at 737-38.
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their own personal convictions and moral values.'39 Kelman and Hamil-
ton use the term "authorization" to describe the process by which people
come to regard their own moral values as irrelevant to their actions.'"
Through "authorization" people authorize another person to make deci-
sions on their behalf."1 Studies suggest that people are able to engage in
acts of great injury and violence to others when they can justify those
acts as being authorized by the legitimate orders of an authority.
Consider the already noted study by Milgram on obedience to
authority.4 4 Although the participants in Milgram's study physically
administered shocks to another person, the participants seemed psycho-
logically removed from their actions.'" They did not view themselves as
moral actors, who were responsible for their actions.45 Instead, they
viewed themselves as merely acting in response to the directives of an
authority.'"
If a legal order is based upon legitimacy, it has tremendous poten-
tial to run amok, committing the types of crimes of obedience discussed
by Kelman and Hamilton. When societal authorities make rules or
decisions that fly in the face of humanity and morality, there is very lit-
tle to stop those forces from being enacted.'" In other words, the moral
values of the citizenry stand as an important limiting force on the po-
tentially immoral actions of the state and state authorities. 149 However,
to the degree that people view the state as legitimate, they regard their
own moral reservations as irrelevant to their decisions about whether or
not to "follow orders."'50 This can potentially lead to widespread acqui-
escence to behavior that is immoral.','
139. See KELMAN & HmILTON, supra note 64, at 16.
140. See id. ('Through authorization, the situation becomes so defined that the individual is
absolved of the responsibility to make personal moral choices.").
141. See id. ("[A] different kind of morality, linked to the duty to obey superior orders, tends
to take over").
142. See id. at 23-52; MILGRAM, supra note 132, at 13-26.
143. See MmIGRAM, supra note 132 (discussing Milgram's experiments on obedience).
144. See KELMiAN & HAmILTON, supra note 64, at 155; MILGRAM, supra note 132, at 36, 38.
145. See KELiAN & HAMILTON, supra note 64, at 155.
146. See id.
147. See i.
148. See id. at 20.
149. See id. at 159.
150. See id. at 157 (discussing the influence that sanctions and fear of embarrassment have on
the public, causing them to conform with authority regardless of their own moral beliefs).
151. See Ed. at 307. Kelman and Hamilton explain:
The reach of authority in coordinating human action has been extended by the devel-
opment of modem bureaucracies and nation states. Concomitantly, crimes committed in
the name of authority have become larger in their scale and more horrific in their out-
come. Crimes of obedience have provided many of the twentieth century's most terrify-
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VII. CONCLUSION: LAW-ABIDINGNESS AS A MODEL FOR THE RULE OF
LAW
The key to understanding a psychological jurisprudence perspec-
tive is to recognize that the legal system relies upon the willingness of
people to consent to the operation of legal authorities. Psychological ju-
risprudence emphasizes the importance of the active cooperation and
willing acceptance of law and legal authorities by members of the pub-
lic. That willing acceptance comes because people view the law as con-
sistent with their moral values and/or because they view legal authori-
ties as making decisions justly. For the psychological jurisprudence
model to work, society needs to create and maintain supportive public
values.
This model reflects an expanded model of human motivation. It
recognizes that the roots of the effectiveness of regulatory authorities lie
in the willingness of the public to be governed by the rules because they
feel that their concerns and needs are being addressed by the law and
legal authorities.'52 In a law-abiding society, most people will follow
most laws most of the time because they think that this is the appropri-
ate manner in which to behave. This self-regulation enhances the effec-
tiveness of legal authorities by freeing them to pay attention to those
problems or people that, for whatever reasons, are less amenable to self-
regulation.5'
Psychological jurisprudence has implications for a wide variety of
areas in the law. In each area, legal authorities need to focus on the issue
of creating and maintaining supportive public values. Consider an ex-
ample from a recent study of citizen-police experiences. In this study,
researchers examined what transpired when the police were called to
homes to deal with issues of domestic violence.&m The concern of the
study was with subsequent compliance to the law on the part of the
abusive men whose behavior led to the initial call. 5 5 From a social con-
trol perspective, we would expect compliance to be increased by threats
and/or punishments on the part of the police. The psychological juris-
prudence perspective suggests that the police can best gain compliance
ing images....
l.
152. See Tyler, Compliance with Intellectual Property Laws, supra note 23, at 232-33.
153. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHwAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING TimE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 106 (1992).
154. See Paternoster et al., supra note 72, passim (examining the results of the Milwaukee
Domestic Violence Experiment).
155. See id. at 164.
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by socializing the offending spouse about the law and their obligation to
obey it. they can do so by treating that person fairly, since the roots of
the perceived obligation to obey the law lie in judgments about the fair-
ness of the legal process. The results support the value of a psychologi-
cal jurisprudence perspective."' If the police treat the abuser fairly dur-
ing their encounter, that abuser is subsequently more likely to comply
with the law. 57 Fair treatment increases feelings of respect for the law,
and leads abusers to be more willing to obey it in the future. This influ-
ence is greater than the impact of threatened or enacted punishments.
5
Similarly, the work of Darley and Robinson illustrates the important
role that the study of public morality can have in the process of building
and sustaining a law-abiding society. The law can build its authorita-
tiveness as an instrument or effectively regulating social behavior upon
people's desire to behave in ways that are morally correct to the extent
that the law is consistent with public morality. Where the law is consis-
tent with existing morality, legal authorities can educate the public
about the law, correcting the many misconceptions that people have
about the law, the courts, and the police. Where the law is inconsistent
with existing public morality, authorities need to examine the law and
consider the reasons for that discrepancy. That consideration should in-
volve a balancing of the potential gains from the jurisprudential goals of
the law against the damage to law-abidingness resulting from public
disapproval.
This study illustrates the core premise of the psychological juris-
prudence perspective-that legal authorities should be concerned with
developing the social values of citizens. This concern leads to a need to
focus on the experience of those citizens, and on their judgments about
the law and the practices and policies of legal authorities. Thus, psycho-
logical jurisprudence is a psychological perspective on the effective rule
of law. It views the key to the successful rule of law as lying in an un-
derstanding of the social values of the citizenry, not in efforts to more
effectively deploy coercive force.
156. See id. at 165.
157. See id at 165-66, 172-74.
158. See id. at 166.
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